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Principal Findings 
What’s the issue?  The response of Myanmar’s military to militant group 
Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army’s (ARSA) August attacks has led to one of the 
most catastrophically fast refugee exoduses in modern times. More than 624,000 
Rohingya Muslims have fled Myanmar to Bangladesh, creating the world’s largest 
refugee camp. 
Why does it matter?  The eviction of the Rohingya community from Myanmar 
is far from the end of the crisis. The situation is transforming Myanmar’s domestic 
politics and international relations, and potential future cross-border attacks by 
ARSA militants could increase tensions between Myanmar and Bangladesh. 
What should be done?  Imposing targeted sanctions can send an important 
message and potentially deter others from similar actions against minority 
communities. But they are unlikely to produce positive change in Myanmar. Even 
as they impose targeted sanctions, the international community should continue 
to provide humanitarian support for Rohingya refugees and resist pressure to 
disengage from the country. 
International Crisis Group 
Asia Report N°292 7 December 2017 
Executive Summary 
Three months after militant attacks triggered a brutal army operation targeting 
Rohingya Muslim communities in Myanmar’s northern Rakhine State, more than 
624,000 have fled to Bangladesh, one of the fastest refugee exoduses in modern times. 
In addition to unimaginable human suffering, the crisis has transformed Myanmar’s 
domestic politics and international relations and will have a huge impact on the 
regional security landscape. 
Myanmar is rapidly losing what remains of the enormous international good-will 
that its political transition had generated. State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi in 
particular has been widely criticised for failing to use her moral authority and domestic 
legitimacy to shift anti-Rohingya sentiment in Myanmar and the government’s current 
course. Meanwhile, the exodus continues and will likely soon reach its tragic end 
point: the almost complete depopulation of Rohingya from northern Rakhine State. 
As the world struggles to define a response, and as the crisis enters a new, fraught 
and highly uncertain phase, several important elements need to be borne in mind. 
First, there needs to be continued insistence on the right of refugees to return in a 
voluntary, safe and dignified manner. At the same time, the grim reality is that the 
vast majority of the Rohingya in Bangladesh will not be going home any time soon. 
This presents the enormous humanitarian challenge of sustaining lives and dignity 
in the largest refugee camp in the world. It also presents grave political and security 
risks that need to be addressed, including potential cross-border attacks by the Arakan 
Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) militant group and possible transnational terrorism. 
Second, it is important to recognise that Myanmar’s political direction has been 
set and will be extremely difficult to change. The strength of the national consensus 
is hard to overstate: the government, military and almost the entire population of the 
country are united on this issue as on no other in its modern history. This will make 
it extraordinarily difficult to move official policy. Any imposition of sanctions thus 
requires careful deliberation: they can help send a welcome signal that might deter 
others around the world contemplating similar actions, but they are unlikely to 
produce positive change in Myanmar and, depending on what precisely is done, could 
make the situation worse. 
This report examines the lead-up to the ARSA attacks on 25 August 2017, revealing 
new and significant details about the group’s preparations, and the attacks themselves. 
This is based on research in Myanmar and Bangladesh since October 2016, including 
interviews with members of ARSA, analysis of WhatsApp messages sent by the group 
and its supporters, publicly-posted videos and interviews with villagers in Rakhine 
State and recently-arrived refugees in Bangladesh. Much of the research has been done 
by experienced personnel fluent in the Rohingya language.  The report also assesses 
the impact the crisis will have on Myanmar. Finally, it discusses some possible inter-
national policy responses.  
Brussels, 7 December 2017 
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Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis Enters  
a Dangerous New Phase 
I. Background to the Crisis 
While the current crisis is rooted in longstanding discrimination and denial of human 
rights, the immediate trigger was the emergence of a militant group within the 
Rohingya population in the north of Rakhine State.1 This hardened national senti-
ment toward the Rohingya and shifted the calculus of the security forces. 
Harakah al-Yaqin, subsequently rebranded in English as the Arakan Rohingya 
Salvation Army (ARSA), first began organising itself after deadly communal violence 
in 2012. It launched its initial attacks – coordinated assaults on the Border Guard 
Police (BGP) headquarters and two other bases – on 9 October 2016. Previous armed 
militant groups had been based in the hills (the Arakan mujahidin in the 1950s), or 
launched hit-and-run attacks from across the border in Bangladesh (for example the 
Rohingya Solidarity Organisation in the 1990s). In contrast, ARSA operates from 
within Rohingya villages, using cells of villagers who have been given some basic 
training but most of whom do not have access to firearms, only bladed weapons and 
some improvised explosive devices (IEDs).2 
In response to the October 2016 attacks, the military deployed overwhelming 
retaliatory force against nearby villages, followed by extensive “clearance operations” 
– brutal counter-insurgency operations that the military has used for decades in 
other parts of the country – with the stated purpose of recapturing the dozens of 
small arms and thousands of rounds of ammunition looted by ARSA.3 When troops 
came under attack from militants and villagers and a senior officer was killed, the 
military further escalated, including the use of helicopter gunships in civilian areas. 
Over the following weeks, tens of thousands of Rohingya fled to Bangladesh and 
security forces burned down several thousand homes.4 A United Nations (UN) human 
 
 
1 For detailed background on the situation in Rakhine State, see Crisis Group Asia Reports N°s 283, 
Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State, 15 December 2016; 261, Myanmar: The 
Politics of Rakhine State, 22 October 2014; and 251, The Dark Side of Transition: Violence Against 
Muslims in Myanmar, 1 October 2013. For other recent Crisis Group reporting on Myanmar, see 
Asia Briefings N°s 149, Myanmar’s Peace Process: Getting to a Political Dialogue, 19 October 
2016; 147, The Myanmar Elections: Results and Implications, 9 December 2015; also Asia Reports 
N°s 290, Buddhism and State Power in Myanmar, 5 September 2017; 287, Building Critical Mass 
for Peace in Myanmar, 29 June 2017; 283, Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine 
State, 15 December 2016; 282, Myanmar’s New Government: Finding Its Feet?, 29 July 2016. 
2 See Crisis Group Report, A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State, op. cit. 
3 For details on the Myanmar military’s counterinsurgency approach, known as the “four cuts”, 
see Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 2nd ed. (London, 1999), p. 288 
ff.; Andrew Selth, Burma’s Armed Forces (Norwalk, 2001), pp. 91-92; and Maung Aung Myoe, 
“Military Doctrine and Strategy in Myanmar”, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, working 
paper 339, 1999, p. 10. 
4 Ibid. 
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rights office report found the “very likely commission of crimes against humanity”.5 
A retired senior army officer noted that it would have been more effective to use the 
police to achieve the operation’s stated purpose of recovering the looted weapons and 
ammunition (most were not found).6 
In the months following the October 2016 attacks, ARSA set about consolidating 
its authority in Rohingya villages in northern Rakhine and preparing for the next 
round of attacks. It did this through the targeted killings of dozens of Rohingya men 
with links to the authorities (such as village heads, other local administrators and 
suspected informers), ramped up training in the hills as well as IED production in 
safe houses. The authorities were aware of these developments, with the state media 
reporting many of the killings as well as the discovery of IED factories. For them, the 
next ARSA attacks were seen as a matter of when, not if.7 
 
 
5 “Interviews with Rohingyas fleeing from Myanmar since 9 October 2016”, Flash Report, UN Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) mission to Bangladesh, 3 February 2017. 
6 Crisis Group interview, Yangon, March 2017. 
7 Crisis Group interviews, government officials and military officers, Yangon, Naypyitaw and Sittwe, 
November 2016-August 2017; “Rakhine slayings by insurgents”, Global New Light of Myanmar 
(GNLM), 22 July 2017. GNLM is the state-owned English-language daily. For details on discovery 
of IED production sites, see section II below. 
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II. Build-up to the Crisis 
In the months before the August 2017 ARSA attacks, a series of incidents suggested 
an uptick in ARSA training and preparation, putting Rakhine Buddhist villagers and 
the security forces on edge: 
 On 4 May, the accidental detonation of an IED during an ARSA explosives training 
course in Kyaung Taung village tract (north Buthidaung) killed seven men including 
the instructor, and injured at least five others. According to a reliable source close 
to the events, the instructor was Pakistani, not Rohingya. He was badly injured 
and died in Padakar Ywar Thit village tract (Maungdaw) while being carried to 
Bangladesh for treatment.8 The people carrying him asked a village head to arrange 
his burial in a local cemetery but after being informed of the situation, security 
officials arrested the village head and took the body to Buthidaung hospital. These 
officials were the source of domestic Myanmar media reports some days later 
about the death of a foreign militant. 
 On 7 May, security forces investigating the IED detonation discovered the training 
camp and bomb-making materials. Six days later, the government announced it 
had found the bodies of five victims buried nearby, which they said included two 
foreigners. This prompted security forces to undertake violent evictions and clear-
ance operations in the area (particularly around adjacent Tin May village tract), 
killing several people and prompting some families to flee to Bangladesh in May 
and June.9 
 On June 20-21, the government reported that security forces had killed three men 
while clearing a likely ARSA training camp in the mountains near Sein Hnyin Pyar 
village tract (south Buthidaung).10 
 On 24 June, four Rakhine Buddhist villagers came across bomb-making material 
while foraging in Kyun Pauk Pyu Su village tract (north Maungdaw). ARSA 
members shot two of them dead; the two others, one of whom was injured, fled 
and alerted authorities. However, ARSA members apparently removed the incrimi-
nating material before the security forces reached the spot. This was the first known 
case of ARSA killing non-Rohingya civilians, and significantly increased anxiety 
 
 
8 Crisis Group interviews, local villagers with direct knowledge of the events, Rakhine State, May 
2017. It appears there was a subsequent – possibly related – mass killing by the army of “at least 
scores” of Rohingya in an adjacent village (Min Gyi, or Tula Toli) on 30 August. “‘My World Is 
Finished’: Rohingya Targeted in Crimes Against Humanity in Myanmar”, Amnesty International, 
18 October 2017, p. 21. 
9 While the government says two foreigners were killed in the 4 May incident, ARSA sources say 
there was only one, the Pakistani trainer who died. Six other people died, four on the spot and one 
later at a medical facility in Bangladesh. Five injured people received treatment at different medical 
facilities in Bangladesh; three were reportedly arrested by the Bangladeshi authorities. Crisis Group 
interviews, medical staff, Bangladesh, May 2017; refugees from Tin May, Bangladesh, May-July 
2017. See also “Five Bodies Found in Buthidaung”, The Irrawaddy, 15 May 2017; “Five bodies 
unearthed near 5 May explosion site in Buthidaung”, GNLM, 16 May 2017. 
10 Crisis Group interviews, local villagers, June 2017; “Terrorist training camps, guns uncovered in 
Mayu Mountains”, GNLM, 22 June 2017. 
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among Rakhine Buddhist villagers; some 200 fled to Maungdaw town, fearing 
ARSA attacks. On 27 June, security forces in the area were placed on high alert; 
on 30 June, senior government officials in Naypyitaw discussed the situation at a 
“special meeting on Rakhine State”.11  
 On 1 August, authorities reported that an IED accidentally exploded at an ARSA 
safe house in Pan Taw Pyin village tract (Maungdaw) and that they found explosives 
and other bomb-making material at the house.12 Two days later, eight members 
of the Mro ethnic group, both men and women, were killed in the hills of Maungdaw 
township. The government immediately blamed ARSA, although some local 
villagers say the killings were related to the illicit methamphetamine trade.13 
 On 4 August, BGP clashed with a group of villagers in Auk Nan Yar village tract, 
Rathedaung township, firing a dozen or more shots while trying to disperse a 300-
strong crowd angry over the arrest of villagers suspected of being associated with 
ARSA, including a prominent local imam. During the clash, one of the suspected 
militants escaped; local villagers reported several injuries from gunshots, including 
four people taken to Bangladesh for treatment.  
There were already significant tensions in the area. On 27 July 2017, a Rakhine villager 
had gone missing while foraging in nearby Chut Pyin village tract. Three days later, 
while searching in the surrounding hills, security forces and villagers discovered a 
stash of tarpaulins and food, including World Food Programme (WPF)-branded 
energy biscuits (see section V.A below), which they took to be an ARSA camp. Believing 
militants killed the missing person, Rakhine villagers declared a boycott of Muslims 
in the area. In the nearby village of Zay Di Pyin, Buddhist villagers blocked all access 
roads with barbed wire and prevented residents from going to work or accessing the 
mosque, food markets and water sources.14 According to various sources, on 27 August, 
security forces and local vigilantes perpetrated a mass killing of “at least scores” of 
Rohingya villagers in Chut Pyin.15 
 
 
11 Crisis Group interview, ARSA member with knowledge of the events, June 2017. See also, “Four local 
ethnic people were attacked by swords and killed two”, GNLM, 26 June 2017; “Troops in Myanmar’s 
Rakhine on high alert after killings of Rohingya”, Reuters, 27 June 2017; “Special meeting on Rakhine 
issue held”, GNLM, 1 July 2017. The “special meeting” comprised the president, State Counsellor 
Aung San Suu Kyi, vice presidents one and two, the legislative speakers, deputy commander-in-chief, 
relevant ministers, and national security adviser. 
12 Crisis Group interviews, local Rohingya villagers, August 2017; “IED explodes in Maungdaw”, 
GNLM, 2 August 2017. 
13 According to local sources, the area is on a methamphetamine smuggling route from Buthidaung 
to Bangladesh, and there had been previous tensions between the Mro village and a nearby NaTaLa 
(Buddhist resettlement) village, but generally good relations with nearby Rohingya villages; the 
method of killing of the Mro was not consistent with ARSA assassinations, which normally involve a 
machete cut to the neck. Crisis Group interviews, Rohingya villagers in the area, August 2017. 
14 Crisis Group interviews, local villagers, August 2017. See also “Tents of violent attackers discovered 
in Mayu Mountain”, GNLM, 1 August 2017; “Attack on police force arresting financial supporter of 
violent attackers in Yathedaung”, GNLM, 5 August 2017; “Rohingya villagers blockaded amid fresh 
tensions in Myanmar’s Rakhine – residents”, Reuters, 22 August 2017. 
15 Amnesty International, op. cit., p. 13. 
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These events provoked heightened nervousness. On 9 August 2017, the commander-
in-chief and other senior military officers met with leaders of the Arakan National 
Party, the largest party in Rakhine State – a rare meeting between the top brass and 
a political party. The party expressed concerns about the security situation in northern 
Rakhine and requested the arming of local Rakhine Buddhist militias. That same 
day, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi convened a ministerial meeting on the security 
situation in Rakhine to discuss the recent killings and rising tensions. The following 
day, the government highlighted its deployment of some 500 troops to northern 
Rakhine to reassure local non-Muslim villagers and conduct patrols in the mountains 
between Maungdaw and Buthidaung where militants were suspected of having 
established training camps.16 
The escalatory dynamic was well under way. On 16 August, ARSA uploaded a video 
of its commander, Ata Ullah, flanked by armed fighters and warning the Myanmar 
military to demilitarise northern Rakhine State and end abuses of Rohingya; he 
specifically cited the blockade of Rohingya villagers in Zay Di Pyin. He reiterated 
that the group had no relation with international jihadist groups and said that, 
contrary to government assertions, it did not target Rakhine civilians.17 
 
 
16 See Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Facebook post, 10 August 2017, http://bit.ly/2yqQYSA; 
“State Counsellor, Union Ministers hold talks on security in Rakhine State”, GNLM, 10 August 2017; 
“Myanmar Army Deployed in Maungdaw”, The Irrawaddy, 11 August 2017. 
17 “ARSA Commander Addresses Rohingya diaspora & the world; Warns Myanmar military”, video, 
YouTube, 16 August 2017, http://bit.ly/2AhDSHX. 
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III. ARSA Attacks and Military Response 
A. ARSA Attacks 
In the early hours of 25 August 2017, from 1am until dawn, ARSA launched attacks 
on some 30 BGP posts and an army base.18 Their human wave attacks in some cases 
involved hundreds of people, mostly untrained local villagers armed with farm tools 
as well as some hand-held and remote-detonated IEDs. A small number of further 
clashes occurred over the next several days. The official death toll was fourteen 
members of the security forces, one government official and 371 people the government 
characterised as militants.19 
ARSA initiated the attacks via a WhatsApp audio message delivered shortly after 
8pm on 24 August. It instructed cell leaders to mobilise all male villagers over the 
age of fifteen, assemble in pre-planned locations with whatever sharp objects were 
available and attack designated targets. Many ordinary villagers apparently responded 
to the call, which was often conveyed by respected local Islamic clerics (known as 
“Mullahs” or “Maulvis”) or scholars (“Hafiz”) who seemingly made up most cell leaders 
and who enjoy considerable religious and community authority. Many untrained 
villagers were provided with IEDs for use in the attacks. 
The targets were mostly small police posts and checkpoints, except for the army 
base in Chin Tha Mar village (near Nga Yant Chaung or Taung Bazar), Buthidaung 
township, though not many villagers appear to have joined this attack, which was 
quickly overpowered. ARSA members claim they planned to attack additional targets 
but that some police posts were deserted when militants reached them. Other targets 
were more heavily defended than expected and the attackers suffered heavy casualties. 
The security forces assert that they had several hours advance warning; whether 
accurate or not, they clearly were expecting attacks at some point. 
On 25 August, ARSA issued a series of messages apparently intended both to instil 
confidence and resolve among its members and followers and to promote and glorify 
martyrdom, the goal being to encourage lightly armed male villagers to participate in 
highly risky attacks. Some messages falsely claimed that ARSA was taking control of 
the areas it attacked. Members were also reassured that armed reinforcements had 
been dispatched; they never arrived. 
On 28 August, Ata Ullah issued WhatsApp audio messages instructing his followers 
to burn down Rakhine Buddhist villages with Molotov cocktails. This was in direct 
contradiction to the group’s repeatedly stated policy and prior approach, which was 
to refrain from attacking non-security targets. The reason for this change is not 
clear, though it may have been because non-Rohingya vigilantes from nearby villages 
were helping the military burn Rohingya villages during clearance operations. ARSA 
might have concluded that Rakhine and other non-Rohingya villagers therefore were 
 
 
18 The information in this sub-section comes from Crisis Group interviews with ARSA members, 
Rohingya in Rakhine State and refugees in Bangladesh, August-October 2017; and from analysis of 
WhatsApp audio messages sent by Ata Ullah and others. 
19 Death toll listed in “Humanitarian aid provided to displaced people without segregation”, GNLM, 
6 September 2017. 
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a fair target.20 In the event, the order does not appear to have been widely acted upon 
as only three non-Rohingya villages are known to have been attacked or burned 
down by Rohingya.21 
One particularly high-profile case is the alleged massacre by ARSA of dozens 
of Hindu men and women in Kha Maung Seik (also known as Fakira Bazar) in 
Maungdaw township. Conflicting accounts of the incident and of who was responsible 
have surfaced. Survivors who fled to Bangladesh initially told Bangladeshi journalists 
in late-August that the killers were Rakhine militants; others said later that they 
wore masks, preventing identification. The first report of the incident by Myanmar 
media on 5 September 2017 attributed the killings to ARSA, based on interviews 
with survivors in Myanmar. A more detailed account reaching the same conclusion 
was posted on Facebook on 13 September by a Rakhine nationalist parliament member 
who investigated the incident. The security forces reported finding and exhuming a 
mass grave containing the victims’ bodies on 24 September; these subsequently were 
cremated. It is not clear what forensic evidence remains.22 
B. Catastrophic Military Response 
A brutal military response that failed to discriminate between militants and the general 
population, followed by continued insecurity and restrictions that have imperilled 
livelihoods, has driven more than 624,000 Rohingya into Bangladesh. This is one of 
the fastest refugee exoduses in modern times and has created the largest refugee 
camp in the world. A large proportion of Rohingya villages in the area have been 
systematically reduced to ashes by both troops and local Rakhine vigilante groups that 
were equipped and supported by the military following the 25 August ARSA attacks. 
Grim details of the military and local vigilante campaign of violence, described by 
the UN as “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing” (a characterisation that has now 
been echoed by the United States) and by human rights groups as crimes against 
humanity, have been set out in a series of detailed reports by these organisations. 
They document widespread, unlawful killings by the security forces and vigilantes, 
including several massacres; rape and other forms of sexual violence against women 
and children; the widespread, systematic, pre-planned burning of tens of thousands 
of Rohingya homes and other structures by the military, BGP and vigilantes across 
 
 
20 The Rakhine, a predominantly Buddhist ethnic group, make up the majority of the non-Rohingya 
population in northern Rakhine State, but numerous other ethnic groups live in the area and some 
have also reportedly been involved in vigilante attacks. See Amnesty International, op. cit. 
21 On 28 August 2017, there were deadly attacks on the Rakhine Buddhist village of Auk Pyu Ma 
and the Mro village of Khon Taing (Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit village tract), as well as an earlier attack on 
the Daingnet village of Aung Zan (all in Maungdaw township). ARSA’s involvement in attacks on 
two Hindu villages (Myo Thu Gyi and Kha Maung Seik) is alleged, but not confirmed. 
22 “Hindus too fleeing persecution in Myanmar”, The Daily Star (Bangladesh), 31 August 2017; 
“Mystery surrounds deaths of Hindu villagers in Myanmar mass graves”, The Guardian, 12 October 
2017; “Dozens of Hindus Killed in Maungdaw: Relatives”, The Irrawaddy, 5 September 2017; Kyaw 
Zaw Oo (Arakan National Party, Sittwe-2 constituency), Facebook post, 12 September 2017, 
http://bit.ly/2ApcmZ0; See “45 Hindu corpses cremated”, GNLM, 29 September 2017. 
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northern Rakhine State from 25 August until at least October 2017; and severe, 
ongoing restrictions on humanitarian assistance for remaining Rohingya villagers.23 
Crisis Group’s analysis of population data for northern Rakhine State from various 
sources suggests that around 85 per cent of the Rohingya population in these three 
townships has fled to Bangladesh over the last twelve months, leaving behind only 
100,000-150,000. There are also some 320,000 Muslims in central Rakhine State, 
many but not all of whom identify as Rohingya; 120,000 of these have been confined 
to displacement camps since communal violence in 2012.24 
The three northern townships were impacted in somewhat different ways: 
 Maungdaw township was the focus of ARSA attacks on 25 August 2017 and in 
October 2016. It had the largest Rohingya population and shares the longest 
border with Bangladesh (river and land, as well as adjacent seaboard). It bore the 
brunt of the military response and it appears that almost the entire township has 
been depopulated of Rohingya, apart from some parts of Maungdaw town and a 
small number of villages.25 
 Buthidaung township has historically been less affected by violence and displa-
cement than Maungdaw. It also shares a land border with Bangladesh, along the 
hilly and hard to access northern part of the township; most of the population 
lives in the south. There were no ARSA attacks here in October 2016, only a small 
number in August 2017, to which the initial military response appears to have 
been more localised and limited. Far fewer Rohingya villages were initially 
burned here compared to Maungdaw. While the military response and burnings 
triggered some immediate departures to Bangladesh, the vast majority left later 
to escape untenable living conditions: continued burning of villages and attacks 
or threats by Rakhine vigilantes plus new, severe movement restrictions that 
deprived people of their normal means of survival from farming, fishing, foraging 
and trading. With humanitarian assistance also heavily restricted, communities 
came to the decision in late September 2017 that they had no choice but to make 
the long and dangerous journey in large groups, over the mountains to Maungdaw 
and on to Bangladesh.26 
 Rathedaung township, unlike Maungdaw and Buthidaung, is a Rakhine Buddhist-
majority area that does not share a border with Bangladesh. One of the three 
October 2016 ARSA attacks was here, in Koe Tan Kauk (close to the boundary 
 
 
23 See, in particular, Amnesty International, op. cit., as well as “Destroyed areas in Buthidaung, 
Maungdaw, and Rathedaung Townships of Rakhine State”, UN Institute for Training and Research 
(UNITAR)/UNITAR’s Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT) imagery analysis, 
16 November 2017, http://bit.ly/2iR4YPW; “Burma: New Satellite Images Confirm Mass Destruction”, 
Human Rights Watch, 17 October 2017; “Mission report of OHCHR rapid response mission to Cox’s 
Bazar, Bangladesh, 13-24 September 2017”, OHCHR, October 2017; “U.N. sees ‘textbook example 
of ethnic cleansing’ in Myanmar”, Reuters, 11 September 2017. 
24 Analysis based on 2014 census estimates of non-enumerated (Rohingya) population; government 
2016 General Administration Department figures; UN figures for camp populations; and community 
estimates of Rohingya population by township, all broadly consistent. There are 20,000-plus Muslims 
in southern Rakhine, where communal relations tend to be better. 
25 UNITAR/UNOSAT imagery analysis, op. cit. 
26 Crisis Group interviews, villagers, Buthidaung and Bangladesh, August-November 2017. 
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with Maungdaw); the government claimed an ARSA attack in this area on 25 August 
2017. Subsequent anti-Rohingya violence and threats had a much greater communal 
component. Nearly all Rohingya in the township have now fled to Bangladesh, 
apart from five villages with no viable escape route and only very limited access 
to food or humanitarian support.27 
In addition to the massive Rohingya exodus, the crisis also led to the displacement of 
some 27,000 non-Rohingya villagers and government employees in northern Rakhine, 
most of whom fled the initial ARSA attacks and subsequent clashes. Nearly all moved 
or were evacuated inland, to the main towns of Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Sittwe. 
The government is now strongly encouraging them to return and begin rebuilding 
their damaged or destroyed houses.28 
Since 25 August 2017, the government has blocked access to northern Rakhine 
State by the UN and most other humanitarian actors. The Red Cross movement (the 
International Committee, International Federation, and Myanmar Red Cross Society) 
have been permitted to work, although they face delays and restrictions as well as 
enormous logistical challenges in reaching populations in need; they have called for 
other humanitarian actors to be granted access. On 6 November, the World Food 
Programme was able to resume food aid to Rohingya and non-Rohingya communities 
through the government but with no staff access to monitor distribution directly.29 
 
 
27 “‘We will kill you all’ – Rohingya villagers in Myanmar beg for safe passage”, Reuters, 17 
September 2017. 
28 “Ethnic IDPs who fled homes due to terrorist attacks”, GNLM, 6 September 2017; “Rakhine State 
Govt to Close Hindu, Ethnic Arakanese Displaced Person Camps”, The Irrawaddy, 30 October 2017. 
29 Crisis Group interviews, international humanitarian staff, Yangon, September-November 2017. 
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IV. Dangers Ahead 
A. Repatriation Remains a Distant Hope 
More than 624,000 Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh in the last three months. 
Myanmar’s neighbours and other members of the international community must 
insist on their right of return and press the Myanmar authorities to create conditions 
conducive to a voluntary and safe repatriation. At the same time, prospects are 
extremely dim for the return of any significant number of Rohingya refugees to their 
home areas in Myanmar in the short or medium term. 
Myanmar and Bangladesh signed a repatriation agreement on 23 November 2017 
in Naypyitaw.30 While it was politically expedient for both sides – Bangladesh to 
signal that it will not host the refugees indefinitely, and Myanmar to respond to charges 
of ethnic cleansing and ease pressure for action – it should be seen as a statement of 
intent rather than a sign that return is imminent. On paper, the criteria for returnees 
to be accepted by Myanmar are not too onerous: they need to have left Myanmar after 
9 October 2016 (ruling out historical caseloads) and to provide evidence of bona fide 
residence in Myanmar, with no need for any particular documentation (an address 
should be sufficient). 
But the main obstacle to repatriation is that most are very unlikely to want to do 
so (according to the agreement, returns must be voluntary). The conditions on the 
ground in northern Rakhine are far from conducive, and the exodus of deeply trau-
matised refugees continues. There is lack of clarity from Myanmar on whether they 
would be allowed to return to their villages of origin and reclaim their farmland. The 
agreement also provides for the issuance of National Verification Cards at the point 
of return – a document most Rohingya reject out of fear that it will codify second-class 
citizenship status. The government and security forces have expressed concern about 
the presence of “terrorists” (that is, ARSA) or their supporters among the refugees, 
warning they would arrest such individuals upon return, which suggests returnees 
will be subject to extreme scrutiny or vetting. Another major obstacle is that Rakhine 
Buddhist leaders and communities are strongly opposed to the return of any Rohingya 
refugees.  
Even if these obstacles could be overcome, a repatriation effort on this scale would 
overwhelm Myanmar’s capacity and resources; a senior official asserted that only 300 
could be processed per day. Myanmar has consistently declined any role for the UN 
Refugee Agency, which could mobilise the necessary support as well as credibility in the 
eyes of the Rohingya and internationally; the bilateral agreement does not require it.31 
Fundamentally, neither the government nor security forces possess the political 
will to create conditions for voluntary return and implement a credible and effective 
process to that end. This raises the prospect of a long-term concentration of hundreds 
 
 
30 “Arrangement on Return of Displaced Persons from Rakhine State”, 23 November 2017. 
31 Crisis Group interviews, Rohingya refugees, Bangladesh, September-November 2017; “Sales from 
Maungtaw paddy kept as national budget”, GNLM, 12 November 2017; “Govt Suggests Possible 
Daily Repatriation of 300 Rohingya Refugees”, The Irrawaddy, 30 October 2017; “Tensions over 
Rohingya return highlight donor dilemmas”, Nikkei Asian Review, 27 October 2017; “Returning 
Rohingya may lose land, crops under Myanmar plans”, Reuters, 22 October 2017; “‘Caged Without 
a Roof’: Apartheid in Myanmar’s Rakhine State”, Amnesty International, 21 November 2017. 
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of thousands of traumatised Rohingya confined to squalid camps in Bangladesh, 
with no obvious way out or hope for the future. That would not only be a human 
tragedy, but also a grave security threat. Such a context would be ripe for mobilising 
further violent responses and potential transnational jihadist recruitment.  
B. Security Risks 
ARSA may still be reeling from the enormity of the crisis that its attacks triggered; 
tellingly, no videos of Ata Ullah have been released since 28 August 2017. Still, it 
appears determined to regroup and remain relevant. A Twitter account that likely 
represents the group remains active. It issued a statement on 7 October 2017 announc-
ing the end of its unilateral ceasefire two days later, putting pressure on the group to 
demonstrate its continued capabilities. ARSA has not launched any new attack since 
then, but will undoubtedly strive to do so.32  
Given how ARSA is organised, this will require a significant departure from its 
previous way of operating. Rather than basing uniformed, armed militants in camps, 
ARSA has, to date, organised cells within hundreds of villages, led by a network of 
respected local leaders, including young Mullahs. It attempted to incite a general 
uprising among the population, overrunning police posts using overwhelming numbers 
of ordinary villagers with farm tools, rather than military might. Yet operating under 
cover of the civilian population is no longer possible given that few Rohingya villages 
remain. Most of the group’s organisers and fighters are now in the Bangladesh camps, 
having fled along with the rest of the population.33 
The group may thus shift to cross-border attacks, which would require different 
training, access to weapons as well as operating space in Bangladesh. Acquiring that 
space might now be more realistic given Bangladesh’s anger and frustration toward 
Myanmar. If ARSA launches cross-border attacks, it could aim at opportunistic security 
targets in northern Rakhine or turn to attacking any non-Muslim villagers resettled 
on Rohingya lands, an easier target. 
Inevitably, such attacks would have profoundly negative consequences. They would 
escalate tensions between Bangladesh and Myanmar and could potentially lead to 
clashes between the two countries’ militaries. New ARSA attacks would reinforce anti-
Rohingya sentiment within Myanmar and prompt heightened security measures that 
would further diminish prospects for an eventual refugee return. Moreover, attacks 
against Rakhine Buddhist villagers would inflame anti-Muslim sentiment in general 
and could tip central Rakhine State, so far untouched by the recent violence, into 
crisis. Intercommunal relations are now on a knife-edge, which further constrains 
the ability of Muslims in the area to move freely and access services and livelihoods. 
Communal attacks there are a very real threat, and unlike their coreligionists in 
northern Rakhine, these communities have no viable escape routes. 
 
 
32 “Assessment of the humanitarian pause”, ARSA press statement, 7 October 2017. The Twitter 
handle is @ARSA_Official; the 28 August video is available at http://bit.ly/2hn2V5a. 
33 Crisis Group interviews, ARSA members and well-placed individuals in the camps, Bangladesh, 
September-November 2017. For details on ARSA organisation, see Crisis Group Report, Myanmar: 
A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State, op. cit. 
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Finally, while new ARSA attacks could provoke further violence, international 
jihadist groups represent a far bigger security threat to Myanmar. The country has 
justified what it calls clearance operations by arguing the nation faces a terrorist 
threat. This could be a self-fulfilling prophecy. The plight of the Rohingya has captured 
the attention of the Muslim world, becoming a cause célèbre like perhaps no other 
since Kosovo.  
Al-Qaeda, Islamic State and other jihadist groups, which have long issued state-
ments of solidarity with the Rohingya for propaganda purposes, are now calling 
directly for attacks on Myanmar and its leaders. Most recently, on 27 October 2017, 
the media arm of al-Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent released a video message from 
the group’s leader, Abu Syed al-Ansari, repeating calls for a jihad against Myanmar in 
support of the Rohingya. Myanmar is not prepared to prevent or deal with such an 
attack, which could be directed or merely inspired by these jihadist groups. Any attack, 
particularly on a religious target in a major city, would shred the fraught relations 
between Buddhists and Muslims across Myanmar, potentially sparking widespread 
communal violence; there are Muslim communities in most cities and many rural 
areas in Myanmar.34 
C. Impact within Myanmar 
Extreme Buddhist nationalist sentiment, a growing concern in Myanmar in recent 
years, has contributed to – and been reinforced by – the current crisis. This has 
included anti-Rohingya hate speech in state media under the civilian government’s 
editorial control and in sermons by prominent Buddhist monks.35 
A sermon by Sitagu Sayadaw, one of Myanmar’s most revered monks and a leading 
doctrinal authority, is particularly alarming. Preaching to military officers at a garrison 
and training college in Kayin State on 30 October 2017, he urged unity between the 
military and monkhood, then appeared to provide a religious justification for the 
mass killing of non-Buddhists. He recounted a well-known fifth century legend from 
Sri Lanka commonly used in Myanmar to justify violence in defence of the faith, telling 
the soldiers that no matter how much they had to fight, they should remember that 
non-Buddhists killed were “not fully human”. The sermon and local media reporting 
of it have been widely shared on social media, with many Myanmar people expressing 
support, though some have voiced unease or opposition.36 
The government and military’s repeated, blanket denials of wrongdoing, widely 
disseminated in English and Burmese via state media, further reinforce a climate of 
impunity. This is particularly dangerous given that negative sentiments toward the 
Rohingya population are widespread at all levels of the military and in society as a 
 
 
34 See “Bangladesh dragging feet over repatriating Rohingya refugees, says Myanmar”, Reuters, 
1 November 2017. For examples of earlier propaganda statements see Crisis Group Report, Myanmar: 
A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State, op. cit., section V.E. 
35 For background, see Crisis Group Report, Buddhism and State Power in Myanmar, op. cit. See 
also a 2016 editorial (in Burmese and English) referring to the Rakhine State violence as caused by 
“detestable human fleas” that “we greatly loathe for their stench”; “A flea cannot make a whirl of 
dust, but …”, GNLM, 27 November 2016. 
36 See Matthew J. Walton, “Religion and Violence in Myanmar: Sitagu Sayadaw’s Case for Mass 
Killing”, Foreign Affairs, 6 November 2017. 
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whole. A recent editorial in the state paper dismissed “baseless accusations against 
the Myanmar Armed Forces” and stated that “it certainly does not take a legal expert 
to come to the conclusion that all those village[r]s who took part in the raids are also 
punishable under the anti-terrorism law. This fact may perhaps explain why nearly 
half-a-million people decided to cross over to … Bangladesh”.  
A detailed internal investigation by the military concluded that troops fired “not a 
single shot” on civilians and that “all security members … strictly abided by the 
orders”, a further signal of impunity. In a 21 September speech to northern Rakhine 
State troops, Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing honoured “brilliant efforts to 
restore regional peace, security” and warned that a “race cannot be swallowed by the 
ground but only by another race” (a well-known Burmese saying that is also the motto 
of the immigration department). In a 15 November meeting with U.S. Secretary of 
State Tillerson, he stated that those who had fled to Bangladesh were ARSA terrorists 
and their families.37 
Beyond the risk of further abuses against the Rohingya, the authorities have rein-
forced an ugly strand of nationalism that will outlast the current crisis and could be 
channelled to target other minorities. At a minimum, it will be more difficult for 
national leaders to make the necessary concessions in the peace process of greater 
minority rights and political and economic devolution.38 This could undermine 
prospects for a stable, peaceful and more prosperous future, and thus imperil the 
country’s political transition or significantly shift its landing spot. 
The crisis also will define the country in the eyes of much of the world for years to 
come. This will have a negative impact on trade, investment, tourism and global 
good-will, at a time when Myanmar is emerging from decades of isolation from 
the West. This is in turn likely to feed anti-Western sentiment, leading to greater 
estrangement and potentially cementing the country’s status as a pariah. The govern-
ment’s priority long-term aims – balancing China’s geostrategic influence, integrating 
into the global economy and rehabilitating the military’s international image – may 
now be all but impossible to achieve. 
 
 
37 “Rakhine State affair and cooperation”, GNLM, 2 November 2017; “Troops did not commit sexual 
violence nor killed civilians: Investigation Team”, GNLM, 14 November 2017, p. 10; Senior General Min 
Aung Hlaing, Facebook posts, 21 September 2017, http://bit.ly/2hCQq9o and 16 November 2017, 
http://bit.ly/2muFJY4. See also the dated immigration ministry website at http://bit.ly/-259WAfy. 
38 For details on the peace process with ethnic armed groups, see Crisis Group Report, Building 
Critical Mass for Peace in Myanmar, op. cit. ARSA is not (and likely never will be) part of the peace 
process, given that the Rohingya are not a recognised ethnic group. 
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V. Government and International Response 
A. Government Position 
On the day of the attacks, the government declared ARSA a terrorist group under 
domestic law. It issued a warning to the media to refer to ARSA as “extremist terror-
ists” rather than use terms such as “insurgents”. It claimed that international NGOs 
may have been collaborating with ARSA and that World Food Programme (WFP) and 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) food aid had been 
diverted to the group. The government also stated that ammonia and tubes provided by 
development agencies for construction had been turned into IEDs. These statements 
set the tone for Myanmar’s escalatory response to the attacks and uncompromising 
attitude toward the UN and humanitarian agencies.39 
Allegations of aid agency collusion were condemned by the U.S. ambassador to 
Myanmar as “absurd” and by the UN Human Rights chief as “irresponsible”, as they 
placed humanitarian staff “in danger and may make it impossible for them to deliver 
essential aid”. The accusations resulted in a boycott of aid agencies by their local 
contractors in Rakhine State and shipments came under mob attack. The government 
blocked access to northern Rakhine for all organisations (except the Red Cross) and 
most media.40 
On 19 September and 12 October 2017, Aung San Suu Kyi addressed the Rakhine 
crisis in speeches that were criticised internationally, but gained strong local support. 
She questioned why Rohingya were fleeing, saying there were “allegations and counter- 
allegations” and claiming many Muslim villages were untouched and peaceful. She 
also announced the creation of a national fund for Rakhine State under her direction – 
the Union Enterprise for Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement and Development 
– and lobbied for Myanmar conglomerates and the general population to contribute 
cash; it has so far received some $20 million. Nine taskforces were established, all 
related to development.  
The risk is that if, as seems likely, repatriation does not proceed quickly or at scale, 
and there is no dramatic progress on desegregation or citizenship for Muslim 
communities across Rakhine State, this fund will end up supporting development 
initiatives that increase inequality and exacerbate conflict.41 As we have noted in 
 
 
39 “Anti-Terrorism Central Committee Order No. 1/2017”, 25 August 2017, under 2014 Anti-
Terrorism Law, §72(B); “Warning in relation with extremist terrorists”, GNLM, 28 August 2017; 
“Terrorist hideouts discovered, items provided by int’l organisations found”, GNLM, 30 August 2017. 
40 “US Ambassador Rejects Govt Implication of Aid Agencies in Rakhine Attacks”, The Irrawaddy, 
31 August 2017; “‘Humanitarian catastrophe’ unfolding as Myanmar takes over aid efforts in Rakhine 
state”, The Guardian, 15 September 2017; “Myanmar police fire warning shots in Rakhine as mob 
attacks aid boat”, Agence France-Presse, 21 September 2017. 
41 “State Counsellor: ‘Myanmar does not fear world scrutiny’”, GNLM, 20 September 2017; “Join 
hands for peace in Rakhine”, GNLM, 13 October 2017. The taskforces are: infrastructure, agriculture 
and livestock, economic zone development, information and public relations, job creation and voca-
tional training, healthcare, microfinance, crowdfunding, tourism promotion; “Nine private sector 
task forces formed to participate in UEHRD programme”, GNLM, 22 October 2017. 
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prior reports and briefings, development interventions must be properly sequenced 
with political steps to address discrimination, segregation and citizenship status.42 
B. International Response 
The crisis has prompted significant international scrutiny and criticism. UN Secretary-
General Guterres sent an official letter to the Security Council on 2 September 2017 
– the first time a Secretary-General has done so on any issue since 1989 – saying 
that “the international community has a responsibility to undertake concerted efforts 
to prevent further escalation of the crisis”. The Council met five times in August-
October on the issue – including a briefing by Guterres on 28 September and a 13 
October closed-door “Arria Formula” briefing with Kofi Annan, who was appointed 
by Suu Kyi in 2016 as chair of an advisory commission on Rakhine State, which 
completed its work in August. Guterres called on Myanmar to end the violence, allow 
unfettered humanitarian access, ensure the safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable 
return of the refugees to their areas of origin, and prioritise implementation of the 
Annan commission recommendations – points echoed by several Council members.  
On 6 November, given Chinese and Russian opposition to a resolution, the Council 
instead unanimously agreed on a presidential statement that “strongly condemns 
the widespread violence that has taken place in Rakhine State since 25 August, which 
has led to the mass displacement” of Rohingya communities; “expresses alarm at the 
significantly and rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation”; and “demands the 
Government of Myanmar grant immediate, safe and unhindered access to United 
Nations agencies and their partners”. Myanmar expressed “deep concern” at the 
adoption of the statement and its use of the term “Rohingya”. The UN General 
Assembly approved a human rights resolution on Myanmar on 16 November, reviving 
annual resolutions dropped in 2016 in recognition of the country’s progress.43 
Some countries also raised concerns bilaterally in a series of phone calls and 
meetings with Suu Kyi and the Commander-in-Chief. On 19 September, the UK 
announced it was suspending training programs for the Myanmar military and 
Prime Minister Theresa May signalled her willingness to support further action. The 
European Union Council of Foreign Ministers decided on 16 October to suspend visits 
of Myanmar military officers to Europe and review all defence cooperation, while 
also flagging the possibility of more formal sanctions.  
On 23 October, the U.S. issued a statement outlining its own steps, including 
restrictions on travel of current and former senior military leaders to the U.S., 
cancelling military-to-military engagements and exploring options for visa bans and 
asset freezes under the Global Magnitsky Act. On 22 November, Secretary Tillerson 
declared that the situation in northern Rakhine constituted ethnic cleansing and that 
accountability would be pursued through U.S. law, including possible targeted sanc-
 
 
42 See, for example, Crisis Group Report, Myanmar: The Politics of Rakhine State, op. cit. 
43 See “Briefing under ‘any other business’”, Whatsinblue.org, 12 September 2017; “Public Briefing 
by the Secretary-General”, 27 September 2017; “Adoption of a Presidential Statement”, 6 November 
2017; UNSC Presidential Statement S/PRST/2017/22, UN Security Council, 6 November; Statement 
of Myanmar Permanent Representative, GNLM, 8 November 2017; “Situation of human rights in 
Myanmar”, UN doc A/C.3/72/L.48, UN General Assembly, 31 October 2017. 
Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis Enters a Dangerous New Phase 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°292, 7 December 2017 Page 16 
 
 
 
 
 
tions. Congress is currently vetting draft legislation that would re-impose some of 
the sanctions lifted in 2016.  
Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau appointed a Special Envoy to spearhead 
diplomatic efforts to address the crisis, but the envoy, Bob Rae, was unable to secure 
any meetings with government officials during his visit to Myanmar in early November 
2017.44 
Myanmar set its political direction early in the crisis, and, so far, international 
scrutiny, pressure and diplomatic engagement has brought about no meaningful 
change – not even seemingly minor concessions such as allowing UN humanitarian 
access to the area or signalling openness to international support or advice. Extremely 
strong domestic political consensus on this issue has united the government, military 
and vast majority of the population as never before in Myanmar’s modern history. 
The international community thus faces a major challenge. In the face of ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity, the political and moral imperative to take 
action has become overwhelming. The huge reservoir of international good-will for 
Myanmar and for Suu Kyi personally that existed prior to the crisis is rapidly drying 
up. Many countries wish to support Myanmar’s transition away from military rule, 
and have no desire to undermine its first democratically elected government in more 
than 50 years. But given the strong perception that the diplomatic channel is not 
producing results, and with public views hardening in many countries in the West and 
the Muslim world, the imposition of sanctions by Europe and the U.S. seems inevitable. 
Over time, the drumbeat for holding those most responsible criminally accountable 
will also likely increase.  
Yet policymakers should be under no illusions: sanctions are very unlikely to 
prompt positive change in Myanmar. Indeed, – depending on specifics – they could 
make matters worse. Unlike in the past, there is no domestic debate on different 
policy approaches that sanctions might be thought to influence. Their most likely 
effect will thus be to push the government, military and population even closer 
together and to reinforce current narratives in Myanmar that the West is a fickle friend 
and unreliable partner. Government leaders have explicitly warned that criticism 
and punitive actions from the West will only push them closer to China.45  
History also is a guide. Until 2012, Myanmar was under some of the most stringent 
bilateral sanctions of any country; contemporaneous Crisis Group research indicates 
that these did almost nothing to influence the military regime and had very little 
tangible impact on it. Although termed “targeted”, they had little impact on the regime 
and its leaders, but caused significant damage to the general economy and the fortunes 
of ordinary people – something acknowledged for example by then-Secretary-of-
 
 
44 “UK suspends aid for Myanmar military”, BBC News, 19 September 2017; “Myanmar/Burma: 
Council adopts conclusions”, European Council Press Release, 16 October 2017; “Accountability for 
Human Rights Abuses in Rakhine State, Burma”, U.S. Department of State Press Statement, 
23 October 2017; “Efforts To Address Burma’s Rakhine State Crisis”, U.S. Secretary of State 
Press Statement, 22 November 2017; Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, Yangon, November 2017. 
45 Crisis Group interviews, Western diplomats, Yangon, September-November 2017. See also “U.S. 
Pressure on Aung San Suu Kyi Only Helps China, Aides Warn”, Wall Street Journal, 13 November 2017. 
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State Hillary Clinton when she initiated a review of U.S. policy in 2009.46 There are 
few new options on the table, and any return to sanctions will inevitably involve some 
of the same basic elements. For Myanmar, these do not represent ominous new threats 
but rather the prospect of return to a very familiar status quo ante. 
Policymakers nevertheless feel they should act, not only in response to political 
pressure from their constituents but also to send an important broader signal to 
would-be perpetrators that such abuses will not go unpunished. There are ways policy-
makers can limit potential negative impact on the Myanmar people, who should not 
pay the price for the actions of a military that is constitutionally outside of democratic 
control. 
 First, resist the urge to disengage. Policymakers should not lose sight of the 
distinction between government and people. Myanmar is home to millions of the 
poorest people in the region, and their aspirations for a better economic future 
must not be forgotten. The urge to disengage from the country, therefore, should 
be resisted. People-to-people exchanges with the West through academic, cultural 
and commercial interactions and tourism are crucial for a country that was isolated 
for so many decades. 
 Second, maintain development assistance and non-military engage-
ment. This will be easy for Western countries to commit to in theory, but hard to 
deliver in practice now that Myanmar is no longer a global good news story and 
its government is showing little flexibility on aid modalities. Trade preferences 
recently reinstated by the EU and U.S. are critical in supporting manufacturing 
jobs in Myanmar and should not be revoked. 
 Third, work carefully to minimise the collateral impact of any targeted 
sanctions. Targeted sanctions on specific individuals and entities against whom 
there is evidence of wrongdoing, can help to promote accountability. Recent 
experience in Myanmar shows, however, that ostensibly targeted sanctions can 
have broader systemic impact on the economy that should be avoided. 
 Fourth, engage with the military and government prior to imposing 
any sanctions. The goal should be to maximise any leverage that is available 
(even if minimal) at the critical moment of opportunity, by raising the prospect of 
any new sanctions and pushing for progress on the key objectives before these 
measures are imposed. 
Given the limited utility of sanctions, the international community should do all it 
can to mitigate the humanitarian disaster and influence the situation in other ways. 
This could include: 
 Provide substantial ongoing humanitarian support to the Rohingya refugees, to 
reduce the risks of a further humanitarian catastrophe and alleviate the enormous 
burden on Bangladesh and local communities. This can help also mitigate the 
risk of refoulement. 
 
 
46 See Crisis Group Asia Report N°78, Myanmar: Sanctions, Engagement or Another Way Forward?, 
26 April 2004; Asia Briefing N°118, Myanmar’s Post-Election Landscape, 7 March 2011. “Shift 
Possible on Burma Policy”, Washington Post, 19 February 2009. 
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 Assist Myanmar to define a pathway out of the current crisis, on the understanding 
that at least part of the challenge relates to management and implementation 
ability, in addition to political will. In particular, since the development-first 
approach being pursued by the government will be neither credible nor effective, 
pushing for political decisions to implement key recommendations of the Annan 
commission, including as regards discrimination, segregation and citizenship. 
Meaningful progress on these issues is vital to creating an environment conducive 
to voluntary repatriation, and giving international credibility to the Myanmar’s 
efforts. 
 Begin contingency planning for the humanitarian, security and political conse-
quences of a scenario where the Myanmar-Bangladesh bilateral process does not 
lead to significant numbers of refugees returning home. This will be discussed in 
detail in forthcoming Crisis Group reporting. 
China is particularly well-placed to promote positive outcomes should it decide to 
prioritise these. While in recent decades it has always supported Myanmar govern-
ments politically, and continues to be sceptical of international pressure, its blanket 
support cannot be taken for granted by Myanmar. China does not want this to come 
at the cost of its important relations with Bangladesh and the wider Muslim world, 
which is part of the reason why it allowed the recent UN Security Council presidential 
statement to be issued. China also has significant economic and strategic interests in 
Rakhine State that could be impacted by the crisis. So far, however, it has focused on 
allowing Myanmar and Bangladesh to work out the issue bilaterally. 
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VI. Conclusion 
The actions of the Myanmar military in northern Rakhine State have created a major 
humanitarian catastrophe, a crisis for the country and a security threat to the region. 
It has strengthened an ugly strand of nationalism that will be long-lasting and could 
lead to the targeting of other minorities in the future. The crisis will define Myanmar 
in the eyes of much of the world for years to come, with hugely negative consequences 
across the board on trade, investment, tourism. The country has squandered its 
considerable reserves of global good-will just when it needed them most, as it was 
emerging from decades of isolation from the West. Myanmar has also put itself at 
much greater risk of attack by transnational jihadist groups. Priority long-term aims 
of balancing China’s geostrategic influence and economic dominance in the country 
and rehabilitating the military’s international image have been significantly set back. 
The abuses against the Rohingya minority have captured global public opinion, 
and the uncompromising posture of the government has exacerbated the situation. 
Western countries almost certainly will re-impose some of the sanctions that had been 
lifted in recent years. As they do so, they should acknowledge their inherent limita-
tions and approach them in a manner that can maximise leverage while minimising 
collateral damage on Myanmar’s long-suffering population. 
Brussels, 7 December 2017 
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Appendix A: Map of Myanmar 
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